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- 2008-1-28
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楼主 |
发表于 2008-8-11 16:09
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波浪理论有很强的适用面,下面针对近期热点转发一篇报告,可以看到波浪理论的普遍性,要看英语累看图就成:*18*: :
Global Conflict Trends(全球冲突趋势)
last updated on September 26, 2007.
Global Conflict Trends graphs include information through the year 2006.
Measuring Systemic PeacePerhaps, the most important, and challenging, task for the peace researcher is to establish and maintain a systematic perspective on the general condition of peace in the global system. Without that, progress toward greater peace can not be gauged and social policies can not be properly evaluated. Measuring systemic peace is a necessarily holistic endeavor. Peace is an absolute term and, therefore, a universal condition. The quality of peace can not be improved simply by displacing violence and war to a different setting, or separate category, or by concentrating misfortunes with the less fortunate (ghetto-ization). At the "state-level of analysis" this distinguishes peace from war (and "not-war"), which is a conditional event, and security and insecurity, which are relative terms. At the more general "individual-level of analysis" the quality of peace contrasts directly with the total incidence of violence in the global system, that is, a "human security" perspective. There are many dimensions to violence but only a few are currently measureable at the holistic, global level. The most prominent dimension of violence is lethal violence, and the most dramatic form of lethal violence is organized, military action, or war. Much of what we know about the systemic qualities of peace derives originally from the classic study of inter-state war. More recently, systematic research in organized violence has expanded to cover internal uses of organized violence, that is, situations where organized violence takes place within the sovereign boundaries of a "state." However, it has only been with the advent of the 20th century's "world wars" that the problem of organized violence has been extended beyond the immediate, dyadic focus of research to the regional and global foci. Globalization is not simply an economic process but, rather, the term for the technological movement away from the dyadic analysis of "independent events" toward complex, inter-dependent, "systems analysis." The most fundamental questions for peace researchers at the present time include: "What is the general quality of peace and is it improving, stagnating, or deteriorating?" Where, and under what conditions, is organized violence most likely to occur?" "How do we understand the quality of peace in its many systemic variations, both successes and failures?"
Complex, societal systems defy comprehension but they are not immeasureable. Information and communication resources and technologies continue to improve and, as a result, there are some very general observations concerning the quality of the peace that can be made with reasonable confidence. The ending of the Second World War in 1945 provides a good beginning point for measuring the general quality of the peace. It also marks a turning point in the ways that information is generated, collected, and distributed. The rise of the independent media has been crucial in establishing a more objective perspective on the human condition and it is probably no accident that the rise of the independent media has paralleled a global trend toward greater democracy, the so-called "third wave of democratization."
The following charts provide both contextual and dynamic bases for evaluating the quality of peace. They are constructed from information covering all countries in the world with populations greater than 500,000 persons in 2006 (162 countries in 2006). The theoretical foundations for the systemic peace perspective are explained in Monty G. Marshall, Third World War: System, Process, and Conflict Dynamics (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999). The methodology for measuring armed conflicts is explained in greater detail in Monty G. Marshall, "Measuring the Societal Impact of War," in Fen Osler Hampson and David M. Malone, eds., From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002). Further analyses of conflict trends are published in Monty G. Marshall and Jack Goldstone, "Global Report on Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility 2007: Gauging System Performance and Fragility in the Globalization Era," Foreign Policy Bulletin 17.1 (Winter 2007): 3-21. Earlier societal-systems analyses are published in the Peace and Conflict series (2001, 2003, 2005).
| Figure 1
Global Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-1991 | The red-line charts the trend in general level of interstate war in the global system; that measure includes all wars of independence from the Colonial System and has remained fairly constant at a low level through the Cold War period. We can see from the graph that the UN System, that was designed to regulate inter-state war, has been reasonably effective in providing inter-state security. However, the UN System has not been effective in regulating societal (or civil) warfare. The level of societal warfare increased dramatically and continuously through the Cold War period. Separate research indicates that the increasing level of societal war results from the protractedness of societal wars during this period and not from a substantial increase in the numbers of new wars.Click here for a brief description of the methodology used to create the trend graph.
| | Figure 2
Global Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2006 | The end of the Cold War, marked by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, had an equally dramatic effect on the general level of armed conflict in the global system. The levels of both interstate and societal warfare declined dramatically through the 1990s and this trend continues in the early 2000s, falling over 60% from their peak levels. To review the complete listing, "Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946-2006," used to construct the warfare trends, click here. You may also view regional trends graphs by clicking here.
| | Figure 3
States Experiencing Warfare, 1946-2006 | A second look at the global trend in armed conflict comes from charting the number of states experiencing any form of warfare in each year. Figure 3 charts three different metrics but the trends that emerge remain consistent with those charted in Figure 2. At the peak in 1991, one in every three countries was experiencing some form of serious armed conflict. This has dropped by over one-half since the peak, registering at less than 15% with ongoing armed conflicts in 2006.
| | Figure 4
Global Trends in Armed Conflict Onsets, 1946-2006 | A third perspective on the global trend in armed conflict focuses on the annual numbers of onsets of new wars in the global system to examine their frequency and regularity and whether there have been marked changes in those factors over time. Figure 4 charts three additional metrics:
1) number of interstate war onsets (red bars), 2) number of societal war onsets (blue bars), and 3) total onsets (orange dashed-line). The number of new war onsets fluctuates between one and thirteen per year and the number of new societal wars is generally higher than new interstate wars. There is a peak in new societal war onsets that coincides with the end of the Cold War (1990 and 1991), however, the average frequency of societal war onsets does not appear to have changed across the contemporary period. If we set aside the two peak years demarcating the global system change from Cold War to post-Cold War conditions, the average rate of onset for societal wars changes little: from 3.6 to 3.5 per year. On the other hand, the average rate of onset for interstate wars semms to have fallen by half (from 1.6 to 0.8 per year); this brings down the average number of (total) war onsets to 4.3 per year from 5.2 per year during the Cold War.
| | Figure 5
Global Trends in Armed Conflict Events, 1946-2006 | Whereas Figure 3 looks at the annual number of states directly affected by (any number of) armed conflicts, Figure 5 charts the annual number of ongoing armed conflicts in the global system (overlaid on the onset trend data from Figure 4). This perspective on global trends in armed conflict largely parallels the charted trends in war magnitude and number of states affected, however, this measure shows some evidence that the downward global trend in armed conflicts may be leveling off in the early years of the 21st Century. In late 2007, there are 24 states directly affected by ongoing wars (28 wars total, up from 26 at the end of 2006). Of these 24 states, half (12) are affected by protracted wars, that is, armed conflicts persisting for more than ten years. These protracted societal conflicts include Afghanistan (30 years), Colombia (24), D.R.Congo (16), India (56), Iraq (28), Israel (43), Myanmar (60), Nigeria (11), Philippines (36), Somalia (20), Sri Lanka (25), Sudan (25), Turkey (24), and Uganda (37). These wars continue to defy concerted efforts to gain settlement or resolution.
| | Figure 6
Refugees and Displaced Populations, 1964-2006 | Figure 6 graphs the annual numbers of transnational refugees (including asylum seekers) and internally displaced civilians for all countries, as reported in the United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants' (USCRI) annual series World Refugee Survey (the most recent edition, 2007, counts displaced populations as of December 31, 2006). Beginning with the 2007 edition, the USCRI no longer reports figures for "internally displaced populations" (IDPs); estimates of IDPs are now reported annually by The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. The enormous increase in the global population of forcibly displaced persons beginning in the mid-1980s is difficult to ascertain. There are surely some reporting issues involved but it appears that the magnitude of the increase may be best explained by a confluence of at least four factors: 1) armed conflicts are more likely to be located in poorer countries; 2) the protractedness of societal conflicts progressively challenges the ability of societies to meet and maintain basic needs production; 3) there is a breakdown in distinctions between combatants and non-combatant populations; and 4) there is a tremendous expansion in the numbers and capacities of non-governmental organizations willing to provide humanitarian assistance to war-torn societies.
| | Figure 7
Societal Capacity and Warfare, 1946-2006
The Poorer Countries | Figure 7 presents a comparasion of warfare trends in the bottom three quintiles countries, based on state capacity. Wheras the "long peace" enjoyed by the world's more affluent states is strikingly evident in Figure 8, below, this figure shows that war became concentrated in the bottom two quintiles of states (i.e., the weakest 40 percent). The poorer countries account for a disproportionate share of the global warfare totals across the period. Warfare totals for the bottom two quintiles of states increase steadily through the contemporary period, reaching their peaks in the 1980s. The poorest countries are distinguished from the middle quintile of states in which warfare remains fairly steady until a dramatic increase in the latter 1970s. Countries in the second quintile experience the highest magnitudes of warfare throughout the period. This may be explained simply by pointing out that they have more capacity than countries in the bottom quintile to make war but less capacity than the upper quintiles to manage conflict. At the peak, over half of the poorer countries are consumed by societal warfare. What distinguishes the lowest quintile is the persistence of warfare in the 1990s; this helps to explain the perceived dramatic increase in serious humanitarian crises in the 1990s.
| | Figure 8
Societal Capacity and Warfare, 1946-2006
The Richer Countries | Figure 8 displays the warfare totals for the top three quintiles of state capacity (the third quintile is included to facilitate comparison with the bottom quintiles presented in Figure 7). Readily apparent are the much lower levels of warfare in the upper quintiles. Especially fortunate are the states in the upper quintile where little or no serious political violence takes place for the entire time span. Of course, this good fortune goes a long way to explaining the difficulty of mobilizing "political will" in the richer countries to recognize, let alone meaningfully address, the complex problems associated with armed conflicts in the poorer countries.
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